A Second Look at the Problem of Contradiction Ridden Realities

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In a previous post, I argued, rather dogmatically I admit, that the problem of any conflicting beliefs within the same subjective reality can be resolved by taking the underlying principles on which dependent models of reality are based to their logical conclusions. These logical conclusions would yield, among other things, that contradictions between propositions (i.e. beliefs) can't exist except by way of projection. Consequently, the suggestion, as uneasy as it may be, that any oblivion to their existence, which is to be expected in the minds of those who hold such contradictory beliefs, would amount to a failure for such projection to occur (thereby removing the grounds on which such contradictions can exist) ought to be taken seriously for what it logically implies (namely, that that's all there is to it). The uneasiness of this suggestion was simply chocked up to the difficulty with which we struggle over dispensing with the deeply rooted (perhaps culturally, perhaps psychologically) Platonism that our minds seem in the habit of clinging to. Platonism will reinforce a strong leaning towards an independent model of reality in which a "Truth" is a real (i.e. non-mental) absolute and metaphysical entity whose existence persists independently of one's mind. Thus, any contradiction that may exist between such Truths is also real, absolute, and independent of one's mind, and furthermore itself takes the form of a truth (in virtue of its being subject to formulation as such). The conclusion we are persuaded to draw from this is that no system of thought (i.e. belief) could be sustained as a projected system of truth should there be any contradiction therein. Thus, if any one subjective reality consisted of even a single contradiction, the notion of its projecting as a reality is, at best, problematic, and at worse, impossible. But the solution we entertained in the aforementioned post consisted of a wholesale rejection of reality as an independent model would have it, thereby freeing us from the condition under which a contradiction must exist as a real, absolute, and independent entity. Adopting a dependent model instead, it is our right to posit that contradictions exist only insofar as one is aware of them - and only for the one who is so aware. For anyone else - i.e. those who remain ignorant of such contradictions - those contradictions will not project, and consequently will not exist.

It is the dogmatic flavor of this solution, however, or rather the uneasiness of the aforementioned "suggestion", which has left me open to, and in search of, a more persuasive and conciliatory solution. I believe I have found one, and I will spell it out in this post.

The inspiration for this solution comes from Hume and his skepticism of causation, for I recognize between the two - his skepticism and ours over contradictions - a close kinship in terms of the rationale underpinning them. I'd like to show how the difficulty over the rejection of either concept - in Hume's case, that reality must be exhaustively and causally deterministic, and in ours, that reality must be contradiction-free - as groundable on the same (at least in form) argument. I plan to approach the problem from the same angle as well - namely, through an examination of the relevant concepts (that is, "reality" and "contradiction") - with the aim of exposing their logical compatibility. That is to say, just as Hume showed that there is nothing logically inconsistent with the notion of reality consisting of uncaused events, I in a similar vein wish to show that there is nothing logically inconsistent with the notion of a reality consisting of contradictions between its constituent truths. If I can show this, then I can argue for the possibility of a contradiction ridden thought system projecting as a reality. Should any uneasiness remain after all is said and done, such uneasiness can be chocked up to the same uneasiness that plagues the notion of a reality potentially housing acausal events.

My first task, therefore, is to briefly summarize the Humean argument against necessary causation. It is as follows: We can prove neither empirically nor rationally that a sequence of events is causally related. Two events, the one immediately following the other in time, can only be said to be correlated. There is nothing in time between the events, in other words, that we can identify as a proper "cause". For all we know, the two events occur together purely by coincidence, or a third variable exists unbeknownst to us that causes both. We only ever infer a causal relation after repeated experiences with the two events, and only when such experiences consistently turn out the same. But there is no guarantee that this inference is true. Hume calls this inference a "habit of constant conjunction", which is to say that when two events are constantly conjoined in experience, the mind develops the habit of expecting the consequent event every time the antecedent one occurs. The term "cause", according to Hume, is just the word we use to express this expectation.

That's the argument against any empirical proof of causation. But Hume also puts it in terms that undermine any rationalist proof. As the rationalists would have it, we know causation by way of the principle of sufficient reason, which states that all things have a reason, and in the case of worldly events, a cause. The rationalists would like to take this principle as a hard and fast rule of logic, one akin to the law of contradiction or excluded middle. But if the term "cause" refers merely to an expectation, one rooted in something as contingent as a habit of the mind, then it hardly qualifies as a rule of logic. Thus, Hume contends that the principle of sufficient reason is not grounded on anything remotely as firm as an immutable rule of logic. Rather, it is grounded on the same habit of mind, the same expectation, with which we infer particular causes. Even if we were to concede that, from a statistical standpoint, this expectation is highly reliable in most cases, it is nevertheless an inductive leap. This is Hume's famous Problem of Induction, which is often phrased as "the future is under no obligation to mimic the past" and holds even in the case wherein the past has a perfect record (i.e. no exception to the causal rule exist on record). In other words, Hume argues a strong case for the absence of any rule of logic, and thus any rationalist proof, necessitating that any event be caused by, or the cause of, another.

That's the Humean argument against proof of necessary causation, but there is a larger - and deeper - message we get from this, one that is significant for our present purposes. Namely, it is that we sometimes mistake mere human inclinations or modes of thinking with logical necessity or proof. We have a tendency, even a desire, to assume causal relations linking events constantly conjoined in experience, and we often mistake this tendency or desire with certitude or proof. Note how this mistake is no proof of the contrary either - namely, that such conjoined events are not causally related - but only an overestimation of the grounds we have for asserting causal relations. Hume's skepticism is not a radical shift to the opposite pole, but simply a withdrawal from polarization one way or the other. In fact, it isn't even clear whether Hume doubted causation at all - only that if he did believe in it, he recognized that he must ground such a belief on induction - that is, faith.

To show the relevance of this point to our present purposes, let me rephrase it in terms of concepts. In particular, let me rephrase it in terms of the concepts "reality" and "cause". When isolated from its intricate connections with the latter, the former concept (reality) can be understood as compatible with an acausal picture of how events unfold. If Hume is right, and our concept of "cause" refers to an expectation for a consequent event to follow an antecedent one, then it is based only on constant conjunction in experience, and not any principle of reason. Reason is therefore free to entertain the possibility that reality may consist of uncaused events, and thus it follows that the concept "reality" is not antithetical to the concept of acausal events occurring within reality.

I believe we ought to understand the relation between reality and truth contradictions in nearly symmetrical terms - that is to say, we ought to understand that the concept "reality" is not antithetical to the concept of contradictions subsisting between the truths descriptive of reality. Just as the concept "cause" denotes (for Hume) more a habit of expectation borne out from experiencing constant conjunction than an inherent feature of reality, for us too the concept "contradiction" ought to denote something other than an inherent feature of reality. It ought to denote (that is, we ought to recognize that it denotes) something psychological. And what is that psychological something? It is none other than a feature of (or rule for) logical thought. That is to say, the term contradiction denotes the rule: free your thinking from opposing propositions as a means for conforming to logic.

The key to understanding the force of this argument, not to mention that of Hume's, is to keep in mind the distinction it makes between the concept of reality* and reality itself. The focus of the argument is on the former, not the latter. It is an analysis on the meaning inherent in the concept "reality", and how nothing antithetical to the concept (or meaning) "contradiction" (derived from a similar analysis) follows from it. That is to say, just as one can imagine the possibility of reality tolerating uncaused events, one can also imagine the possibility of reality tolerating contradictions between certain truths pertaining to it.

This is different from imagining contradictory propositions both being true simultaneously. An example of the latter might be to imagine Socrates being both mortal and immortal at the same time, of which I have no qualms conceding its inconceivability. An example of the former, on the other hand, might be to consider the possibility that reality is such that, despite the impossibility of conceiving it, Socrates is somehow both mortal and immortal simultaneously. The difference between these two examples, in other words, is that the former presses us to conceive a logical impossibility whereas the latter presses us to conceive merely the possibility that what is logically impossible is, in fact, actual (i.e. that reality does not conform to logic). The former is, as a rule, inconceivable, but the latter is only about something inconceivable, but may itself be conceivable.

This latter point brings to light a correlate to the argument presented here - namely that whereas the concept of reality is not antithetical to the notion of its tolerating contradictions, logic is. That is to say, whereas one may be able to conceive that reality may tolerate contradictions, one cannot argue logically for such contradictions. So whereas I may be able to assert as a brute fact that Socrates is somehow mortal and immortal simultaneously, and genuinely believe it without any degradation incurred to my concept of reality, I cannot argue for it logically (though I may think I can). If one finds, in other words, that contradictory conclusions can be drawn from the same supposedly logical line of reasoning, that is a sure sign that an error exists in the presumed logic. Be that as it may, the fact remains that reality, or at least our concept of reality, is such that it is not at all incoherent to suppose that it may persist fraught with contradictions independently of our minds. Though such a notion is not incoherent, it is beyond the reach of demonstration by means of logical argument. That is to say, one could never demonstrate by means of a logic proof that two or more contradictory conclusions accurately describe reality.

Nonetheless, the world is chock full of people who really believe in the possibility, or even actuality, that reality tolerates contradictions. This alone is enough to prove the point being made here - namely, that the concept of reality can survive such a notion (however uncomfortable that makes us feel). These people recognize our propensity to find logically consistent accounts of reality as merely a human need, much like Hume recognized the same of causation, and not something we directly perceive in the inherent nature of reality herself. Reality, these people will tell us, cares not for such trivialities as human needs and modes of understanding, and is not affected one iota by these. If reality can be described by contradictory propositions, then it is too bad for us if this puts us ill at ease. The reason why these people are able to propose this is precisely because the concept of reality is such that it can be proposed. Reality is conceived such that it exists and maintains its inner structure and nature independently of our minds and the logic with which we aim to understand it.

The prevalence of so many people who can bring themselves to believe such things is not the only support for such a notion. There is also scientific evidence that reality may in fact feature phenomena that can only be described in this contradictory way - namely, the phenomena, given by quantum mechanics, known as the superposition states of particles. An example of this is the fact that particles sometimes seem to spin in both directions at once. That is, they can spin "up" at the same time as spinning "down" (mind you, the terms "up" and "down", or "spin" for that matter, are technical terms which don't precisely carry the same meaning as the "spin", whether "up" or "down", of an ordinary macroscopic object like a ball or a planet). Another example of a superposition state is how the momentum of a particle will never be determined as one precise value (such as 100mkg/s or 200mkg/s). Instead, particles will always have some range of momentum with no clear boundary marking the limits of this range. For example, the act of measuring the momentum of an electron can be said to yield something in the range of (say) 100mkg/s and 200mkg/s with a probability of 95%. What this means, in other words, is that the particle is moving at a whole range of speeds all at the same time. It is moving with both momentums 100mkg/s and 200mkg/s - and every other value in between - simultaneously.

Now, although such notions as spinning up and down at the same time, or moving at different speeds at the same time, jar the intellect for sure, it is still questionable whether it warrants interpreting reality as featuring contradictions. One objection that might be raised against this interpretation is that a true contradiction takes the form of "A and not A" whereas for a particle to spin both up and down simultaneously can only be formulated as "A and B" (where A="The particle spins up" and B="The particle spins down"). One might infer that spinning down is semantically equivalent to not spinning up, but that is the crux of the objection. Those who hold to this objection would be those who take the findings of quantum mechanics to indicate that it is not true that a particle's spinning down entails its not spinning up - that is, particles can spin in both directions simultaneously. In other words, where the proper formulation of the proposition in question is "A and B" (as opposed to "A and not A"), both "not A" and "not B" can be ruled out precisely because both A and B are established and take priority. Essentially, the point would be that spinning up and down is no different for a particle than being red and soft is for a sweater. Though the former may seem contradictory, this is a mistake on our part - that is, our intellect is merely built to interpret the former as contradictory, and that beyond our intellect, such an interpretation does not hold sway.

Yet another objection might follow: that the term "superposition" is best understood to denote a state that is, for all intents and purposes, inconceivable to us, and when we describe such states as (for example) "a particle spinning up and down simultaneously", this is only the closest approximation we can articulate given the limits of our language and understanding. In other words, it is not true to say "the particle spins both up and down simultaneously" - not exactly - for whatever is the case, it cannot be put into words at all. Thus we have no right to describe the superposition states of particles in contradictory terms - at least, not on the grounds of these considerations.

That being said, such objections are ultimately inconclusive - the first because if B did connote "not A" (or A connoted "not B"), we would have the same findings, and although A would certainly still be one of them, "not A" would, in virtue of B, also hold true - and we would be forced to concede that reality operates under contradicting principles. The second objection is inconclusive one two grounds: first, that although superposition states might denote occurrences in reality that are incomprehensible to human understanding, the alternative - namely, that there is nothing wrong with our understanding and contradictory states are in fact what we have - has not been ruled out. Secondly, even if superposition states do denote incomprehensible occurrences in reality, it doesn't follow that those occurrences will unfold according to the rules of logic (or any set of rules that guarantee freedom from contradiction). The only thing that would follow would be that we are dealing with unknowns, and reality may yet feature contradictory states.

But whatever the case, quantum mechanics has certainly bolstered notions of contradictions in reality and made them more plausible to a great many. But none of this can be taken to either logical conclusion - that reality features contradictions or is consistent through-and-through. Therefore, I implore the reader to note the following about my overall argument: that I never once said, nor will I ever say, that reality is subject to description by means of contradictory terms. This is where the distinction between the concept of reality and reality itself, a distinction we admonished the reader to heed earlier in this post, is most relevant. The argument so far no more suggests that this is the case, or is even possible, than Hume's argument suggests that acausal events actually happen or are possible (quantum indeterminism, as we've just seen, seems to suggest otherwise, but this is neither relevant to the force of Hume's argument nor conclusive on the matter). It might be the case that reality can be described in contradictory terms (at the peril of MM-Theory, of course), but nothing of the argument so far supports or denies this. It is simply not for us to say. What we are saying here is that the concept of reality (not reality itself) is consistent with the concept of its featuring contradictory states (and this without the concept of reality being inherently contradictory in and of itself). Thus, a reality design that features contradictory elements may still project without negating its standing as a reality.

We would nevertheless like to stay consistent in our analysis of reality and our quest to understand, for if ever we arrived at contradictory conclusions, we ought to urge ourselves to re-examine our analysis and find the logical blunders we inadvertently stumbled over. What we want in the end is a thoroughly consistent account of reality, one that will survive any onslaught of criticism and panel of objections. That is why in building MM-Theory, we will always strive for logical consistency (or as close as we can get) despite arguing for the possibility of projecting reality containing contradictions. The latter may be possible for some arbitrary individual, but we don't want that for ourselves. Contradictions in a reality can only function to weaken the arguments in support of it, and so long as such contradictions exist, they can be exploited. Thus, we still want to avoid contradictions for all the usual reasons.

Yet I anticipate the following objection: to permit any arbitrary system of belief, however fraught with contradictions, projects those contradictions along with the reality that houses them, thus by implication making those contradictions real in the Universal Mind of MM-Theory. MM-Theory, in other words, features those contradictions. We can reply as follows: we ought to keep in mind that although such contradictions will, in virtue of projecting, become real, they are still cognitive, or propositional, in nature, and so their realness - or rather their truth - is just as MM-Theory says it is - namely, relative. That is to say, the contradictory propositions in question are only true relative to a particular reality design. More specifically, they are true relative to the reality belonging to the beholder - that is, the one who believes in them. They are not necessarily true of MM-Theory itself. They may be true in MM-Theory - or rather in the Universal Mind as depicted by MM-Theory - but this is wholly different from the notion that they are true of MM-Theory (or the Universal Mind). The latter notion is nothing more than a gross misunderstanding of the relative nature of truths (i.e. beliefs, propositions, etc.). However much such truths may be found in the Universal Mind, they are not about it - rather, they are about a completely different reality design, one that stands as an alternative to MM-Theory. We may still have to concede the truth of their relation to each other being a contradiction (for that, I'm sure the reader will agree, would be true in all possible worlds), but this is no more detrimental to the logical consistency of our theory than conceding that a fairy tale or the delusions of a raving schizophrenic might feature contradictions is detrimental to the logical consistency of any ordinary understanding of reality.

After all is said and done, I personally feel that this reconciliation on the problem at hand is superior to the one entertained previously (that is, in the previous post that this one is a follow up to), not only in that it frees us from the burden of having to brutely deny the projecting of contradictory beliefs in the subjective realities of those who hold such beliefs, but also in that it entitles us to posit this projecting even when the subject consciously accepts his reality with those very contradictions (i.e. as someone who believes reality can be described in contradictory terms). Such a double edged sword is a suitable note to close on. We can assert, with the above rationale, that no need exists to account for the projection of whole realities (or at least, reality designs) when those realities consist of certain truth contradictions because the projection of reality proper (i.e. as the concept of reality) is utterly unaffected by such contradictions persisting within it. Thus, in conclusion, we will leave the issue as such - namely, as a non-issue.


* This is the concept of reality qua reality - that is, regardless of any consideration of what reality consists of or contains.


Read my theory: http://www.mm-theory.com

Rewrote Advanced Theory

Read my theory: http://www.mm-theory.com


I have recently rewritten large portions of the Advanced Theory. In particular, I have rewritten my account of selfhood - what it is and how to explain it - and my account of space, time, and momentum, and what they represent vis-a-vis their correspondences beyond human experience. I would advise the reader to check them out.


Read my theory: http://www.mm-theory.com